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Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7038
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: SCHEDULING OF INSTALLATION OF ISIS

CTB MESSAGE NO.167

1. IN SPITE OF THE NEGATIVE STANCE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS TAKEN TOWARD THE US PROPOSAL FOR ISI DESIGN, THEIR COUNTER APPROACH IS IN BROAD OUTLINE NOT TOO DISSIMILAR FROM THAT OF THE US APPROACH. UNTIL THEY SUPPLY A DETAILED ELABORATION OF THEIR APPROACH IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING DIFFICULTIES. IT IS, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZED BY BOTH SIDES THAT ISIS OF AGREED DESIGN COULD NOT BE INSTALLED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A CTBT. MOROKHOV IN HIS ISI STATEMENT SAID THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD BEGIN FROM THE MOMENT THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE UTILIZING AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT. SEVERAL SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBERS HAVE SUGGESTED IN A GENERAL WAY A PHASED APPROACH: UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT
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FOR VERIFICATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY AND INSTALLATION OF ISIS; AND THE INTRODUCTION OF ISIS IN A GRADUATED PROGRAM. THE US HAS FOR ITS PART TAKEN NOTE OF A POSSIBLE PROVISION FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD IN PARAGRAPH 1(F) OF THE LANGUAGE FOR THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT REGARDING A JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, WITHOUT HOWEVER SUPPLYING ANY

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THOUGHTS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH A PROVISION.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT THE US SHOULD NOW GIVE ATTENTION TO THE ISSUES WHICH TURN ON THE TIMING OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ISIS, OF WHICH THE INTERIM PROCEDURFS CAN BE CONSIDERED AS THE FIRST PHASE (POSSIBLE INTERIM PROCEDURES ARE SUGGESTED IN SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS). SINCE ISIS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT UPON ENTRY-INTO-FORCE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE DELEGATION TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS AND MAKE COMMITMENTS ON THE SCHEDULE OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE ISI NETWORK. DECISIONS MADE NOW ON THE BUDGET AND PROGRAM PLANNING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF ISIS WILL HAVE A DIRECT EFFECT ON THE TIMING OF AVAILABILITY AND INSTALLATION OF ISIS. BASED UPON THESE PROGRAM PLANS FOR ISIS, TARGET DATES FOR A DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHICH COULD BE USED WHEN APPROPRIATE BY THE DELEGATION. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT ANY COMMITMENT TO A DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE WOULD HAVE TO BE FLEXIBLE SO AS TO PERMIT SLIPPAGE BEYOND ANY TARGET DATE IF THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM WERE DELAYED. WITH REGARD TO PROGRAM PLANNING, IT APPEARS IMPORTANT TO US THAT EVERY ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO BUILD THAT RELIABILITY INTO THE ISIS WHICH WE HAVE ASSURED THE SOVIETS WOULD EXIST, EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF EXTENDING THE TESTING AND PRODUCTION TIME. FREQUENT FAILURE OF INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIELD WOULD UNDERMINE THE VERIFICATION CONTRIBUTION

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OF THE ISIS AND WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS IF A FREQUENT PRESENCE OF US PERSONNEL FOR MAINTENANCE WERE REQUIRED.

3. IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF ISIS IS DISCUSSED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC DATES. ADDITIONALLY, CONSIDERATION ALSO NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO THE PROBLEMS SPECIFICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE SITING AND INSTALLATION OF ISIS IN THE US.

4. IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN ENTRY-INTO-FORCE AND THE BEGINNING OF INSTALLATION OF ISIS TWO APPROACHES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME MEASURE OF VERIFICATION SUGGEST THEMSELVES. FIRST, THERE COULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA FROM SOME NUMBER OF EXISTING STATIONS. THIS WOULD NOT, FROM THE US POINT OF VIEW ADD ANYTHING TO VERIFICATION CAPABILITY NOR REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL STEP. HOWEVER, THE DATA COULD BE USEFUL FOR STUDYING THE PROPAGATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION. THE DEGREE OF USEFULNESS WOULD DEPEND ON THE QUALITY OF THE STATIONS.

5. A PREFERABLE APPROACH, OF MORE SUBSTANTIVE CHARACTER,

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WOULD BE TO BEGIN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SITE SELECTION PROCEDURES IMMEDIATELY UPON ENTRY-INTO-FORCE AND INSTALL SEISMIC RESEARCH OBSERVATORIES (SROS), THE BEST OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGY, AT SOME OF THE SITES. SINCE SRO PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE EXISTS NOW, THIS PROCEDURE MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT IN A PERIOD OF ABOUT SIX MONTHS, OR EVEN LESS, IF EXISTING SITES WERE SUITABLE. DATA WOULD BE RECORDED ON MAGNETIC TAPE, RETRIEVED PERIODICALLY, AND PHYSICALLY TRANSFERRED (I.E., SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

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WOULD NOT BE USED). IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE AN AUTHENTICATOR UNIT ADDED TO THE SRO EQUIPMENT. THIS WOULD ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHENTICATION FROM THE BEGINNING. WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION, THE DATA WOULD NOT BE USEFUL FOR MAKING VERIFICATION DECISIONS, BUT WOULD SERVE FOR STUDYING THE PROPAGATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION. THE VALUE FOR THIS LATTER PURPOSE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN FOR DATA FROM EXISTING SOVIET STATIONS.

6. THIS SECOND APPROACH WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES. IT WOULD SHOW GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF BOTH COUNTRIES IN MOVING PROMPTLY TO IMPROVE VERIFICATION; PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH GOOD WORKING RELATIONS BEFORE THE INSTALLATION OF THE LARGER AND MORE COMPLEX ISI NETWORK, AND EASE THE TIME PRESSURE ON TESTING AND PRODUCTION OF ISI. MOREOVER, SRO INSTALLATIONS

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NOW EXIST IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD AND IT WOULD SEEM DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO ADVANCE SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THEIR USE SINCE THEY ARE
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GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE. ALSO SINCE THE SRO SENSORS ARE USED IN THE PROPOSED ISI DESIGN, THIS WOULD REFUTE THE SOVIET CONTENTION THAT THE ISI DESIGN IS EXCESSIVE WITH RESPECT TO SEISMIC DETECTION CAPABILITY. ALTHOUGH THE ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES BEYOND THESE DEVELOPED FOR ISIS NEEDED FOR UTILIZATION OF SROS IN THE INTERIM WOULD BE SIMPLE, IT WOULD BE AN ADDITIONAL MATTER TO NEGOTIATE.

7. DURING THE FIRST PHASE -- THE INTERIM PERIOD -- SITE SELECTION FOR ALL SITES COULD BE COMPLETED. DURING THE SECOND PHASE, THE SROS WOULD BE CONVERTED TO ISIS (BY REPLACEMENT OF THE BOREHOLE PACKAGE AND SURFACE EQUIPMENT) AND THE ISIS WOULD BE INSTALLED AT THE REMAINING SITES. A DATE IN THE AGREEMENT FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BUT WITH A PROVISION FOR DEFERRAL IF THE ISIS WERE NOT READY AT THAT TIME. THIS SECOND PHASE COULD BE FURTHER DIVIDED INTO TWO STEPS, WITH ONLY SINGLE STATIONS INSTALLED FIRST AND THEN AFTER SOME SET TIME PERIOD, ARRAYS. DEFERRING THE ARRAY CONSTRUCTION MIGHT HAVE SEVERAL ADVANTAGES. IT WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE ADVANCED SYSTEM AND DATA MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN A GRADUATED PROGRAM; WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TIME TO OPTIMIZE ARRAY DESIGN AND TO EXPAND DATA MANAGEMENT FACILITIES TO HANDLE THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN DATA; WOULD ALLOW THE POSSIBILITY TO REVISE DESIGN OF THE ARRAY ELEMENTS IF TROUBLES APPEARED IN THE DEPLOYED SINGLE ISIS; AND SPREAD THE COST OVER A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME.

8. THE PHASED APPROACH SKETCHED ABOVE WOULD DEMONSTRATE INCREASING INSTRUMENTAL SOPHISTICATION WITH TIME TO MATCH INCREASING CONCERN WITH VERIFICATION. THIS COULD HELP ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE SYSTEM SHOULD BE
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REVIEWED PERIODICALLY AND UPGRADED TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM AT STATE-OF-THE-ART LEVEL, THUS CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VERIFICATION PROGRAM. WARNKE

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